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STATEM ENT
This is an action brought by colored children of the elementary, gram­
mar and high school grades residing in School District No. 22 in Clar­
endon County, and their parents and guardians, for a declaratory judg­
ment on questions which, from the complaint, may be stated as follows:
(a) Whether their rights under the equal protection of the laws clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
to educational opportunities, advantages and facilities equal to those af­
forded and available to white school children of the same grades in the 
district have been denied; and
(b) Whether the provisions of the Constitution and Statutes “which 
prohibit” the colored children of the school district “from attending the 
only public schools of Clarendon County, South Carolina, affording an 
education equal to that afforded” to white children, are violative of 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
They allege that separate schools for the white and colored pupils are 
maintained in the school district pursuant to the provisions of Article XI, 
Section 7, of the Constitution of South Carolina, and Section 5377 of 
the Code of Laws of South Carolina of 1942; that the schools provided
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for white pupils are superior in plan, equipment, curricula, and in all 
material respects to the schools provided for colored pupils; and that 
the Constitutional and Statutory provisions referred to deprive the col­
ored pupils of the district of the opportunity of attending the only public 
schools in Clarendon County where they can obtain an education equal 
to that afforded to the white pupils.
The answer of the defendants alleged that substantial equality of 
educational facilities between the white and the colored pupils was af­
forded in the district. At the trial, however, an amendment to the answer 
was permitted by the Court, wherein the defendants conceded that the 
educational facilities, buildings, equipment, curricula and opportunities 
afforded in School District No. 22 for colored pupils of the school grades 
mentioned are not substantially equal to those afforded in the district 
for white pupils. It was pointed out in the amendment to the answer 
that the school district in question is a rural one whose economy is al­
most entirely agricultural, a type of school district in South Carolina 
which has not kept pace in recent years with the larger urban districts 
in the provision of educational opportunities and facilities to the children 
of both races. Reference was made to the legislation enacted by the 
General Assembly of the State of South Carolina in 1951, specifically 
declaring its purpose to be to bring about equality of educational op­
portunity for all children throughout the state, as a matter of statewide 
as well as local concern (including the imposition of a three per cent, 
sales tax, effective July 1, 1951, with the whole of its proceeds devoted 
to school purposes, the authorization of a state bond issue with a max­
imum limit at any one time of $$75,000,000.00, and financing therefrom 
to the school districts of the state for establishing and maintaining ade­
quate physical facilities for the public school system, under the super­
vision and control of the State Educational Finance Commission cre­
ated in the legislation).
The defendants allege that they will employ the financial resources 
made available to them under this legislation to bring about the equali­
zation of buildings, equipment, facilities, and other physical aspects of 
the school system of the district, and will eliminate any other inequali­
ties of educational opportunity existing in the district’s schools, includ­
ing curricula.
They do not oppose an order finding that inequalities in respect to 
buildings, equipment, facilities, curricula, and other material aspects of 
the schools provided for the white and colored children of School Dis-
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trict No. 22 in Clarendon County now exist, and enjoining any dis­
crimination in respect thereto.
They urge the Court, in its discretion, to give to the defendants a 
reasonable time to formulate a plan for ending such inequalities and for 
bringing about equality of educational opportunity in the schools of 
the district, so that they may present such plan, with the approval of 
the state authorities necessary under the 1951 legislation, for the Court’s 
consideration. They suggest that the Court retain jurisdiction of the cause 
in the meantime so that, in the event the defendants should fail to com­
ply with the constitutional standards prescribed in the applicable de­
cisions, it may be enabled to grant such relief as may be proper under 
the circumstances.
The evidence shows that the white pupils of high school grades at­
tend the Summerton High School, along with the white high school 
pupils of four other school districts of Clarendon County, School Dis­
trict No. 3, School District No. 4, School District No. 8, and School 
District No. 30. The total enrollment of the Summerton High School 
is 76, with an average daily attendance of 73. This high school is a 
centralized high school provided by the joint action of the five districts 
whose pupils attend it, and is operated by a high school district, a 
separate body corporate, which came into existence under the provisions 
of Section 5409 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina of 1942, with 
the chairmen of the several cooperating districts constituting its board 
of trustees under the provisions of Section 5406 of the Code of Laws. 
The defendant Elliott, as Chairman of the Board of Trustees of School 
District No. 22, is the only trustee of the centralized high school district 
who is made a party to this action, although the district itself is named 
as a defendant.
The Summerton Elementary School is a school provided and op­
erated by School District No. 22, and is attended by the white pupils 
of elementary and grammar grades who reside in School District No. 
22, as well as the white pupils of those grades who reside in the other 
four school districts above mentioned. The total enrollment in the Sum­
merton Elementary School is 199, with an average daily attendance of 
160.
School District No. 22 provides and operates three school buildings 
for colored pupils; Scott’s Branch School, which combines elementary, 
grammar and high school grades, with 12 grades and 14 teachers, Lib-
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erty Hill Elementary School which has 7 grades and 4 teachers, and 
Rambay Elementary School which has 7 grades and 2 teachers.
The high school enrollment of colored pupils in Scott’s Branch School 
is 149, with an average daily attendance of 124. This enrollment is made 
up of the colored pupils of high school grade who reside in School Dis­
trict No. 22, as well as those residing in the other four school districts 
above mentioned. The total elementary and grammar enrollment of col­
ored pupils in the three schools of School District No. 22 is 717, with 
an average daily attendance of 469.
The total enrollment of white pupils in the five districts is 277, with 
an average daily attendance of 253, or approximately 91%. The total en­
rollment of colored pupils in the five school districts above mentioned 
is 2,144, with an average daily attendance of 1,538, or approximately 
72%. Colored absenteeism is heavy at the beginning and end of the 
school year, when children are kept home by the parents to help with 
the planting and harvesting.
The evidence shows that under the 1951 legislation School District 
No. 22 will be enabled to borrow against the State School Fund cre­
ated in the act, the sum of $190,350.00, on the basis of the present 
average daily attendance of pupils above shown. Including the central­
ized white high school, the value of the school buildings, the grounds 
and the furniture and fixtures of School District No. 22 at present is 
$70,050.00, so that it will be seen that the amount available to the dis­
trict under the 1951 act is more than two and a half times the value of 
the centralized high school building and all of the school property,
grounds, furniture and fixtures in School District No. 22 at the present 
time.
The evidence affords clear indication that the five school districts 
above mentioned offer a natural consolidation of districts, in keeping 
with the purpose and provisions of the 1951 act. The evidence also 
shows that the five districts together will have a borrowing capacity 
under the 1951 act of a total of $402,975.00, available for capital con­
struction and furniture, fixtures and facilities.
Both School District No. 22 and the combined five school districts 
will have an increased borrowing capacity with any increase in the 
present low average daily attendance of the colored pupils.
The evidence (R. 152) shows that the Summerton Elementary 
School (white) which was built in 1907 is practically beyond repair,
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and (R. 57) that the Scott’s Branch School (colored) can give ap­
proved and efficient education if it be improved. The funds available 
to the five districts for financing capital construction and equipment 
amount to $187.00 for each pupil enrolled, and loans available to the 
districts under the Act would provide $5,610.00 per class-room unit 
of 30 pupils on the present enrollment. With bus transportation pro­
vided for in the Act, it is fair to assume that the two-teacher and four- 
teacher schools will disappear in the districts.
The degree of control vested in the State Educational Finance Com­
mission is shown by its rule making power, Article III, Section 3; its 
duty to make a survey of the entire school system to ascertain what con­
struction, equipment, new transportation facilities, and other improve­
ments are necessary “to enable all children of South Carolina to have 
adequate and equal educational advantages,” Article III, Section 4; and 
its power to deny applications for the use of State building funds under 
the Act until an acceptable and reasonably satisfactory plan has been 
submitted, Article IV, Section 3.
The evidence shows (R. 151) that the defendant trustees will use 
the full potential of the district to obtain funds, and utilize them to the 
fullest advantage to develop the educational facilities and education in 
the district.
ARGUMENT
Article XI, Section 5, of the Constitution of South Carolina provides: 
“The General Assembly shall provide for a liberal system of free 
public schools for all children between the ages of six and twenty- 
one years. * * *”
Article XI, Section 7, with reference to the schools of such school 
system, provides:
“Separate schools shall be provided for children of the white and 
colored races, and no child of either race shall ever be permitted to 
attend a school provided for children of the other race.”
Section 5377 of the Code of Laws provides:
“It shall be unlawful for pupils of one race to attend the schools 
provided by boards of trustees for persons of another race. * * *”
The plaintiffs contend that the constitutional and statutory provisions 
prescribing separate schools for children of the white and colored races
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on their face contravene the equal protection of the laws clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Consitutionality of Separate Schools
Separate schools for the white and colored races have existed in most 
of the states of the United States, both before and since the ratification 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and still exist by law in 17 states and 
in the District of Columbia.
In 1849 in Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. 198, the Supreme Ju­
dicial Court of Massachusetts held that the general school committee of 
Boston had power to make provision for the instruction of colored chil­
dren in separate schools established exclusively for them, and to prohibit 
their attendance upon other schools. The plaintiff in that case, repre­
sented by a “learned and eloquent advocate,” Charles Sumner, relied 
upon “The great principle * * * that by the constitution and laws
of Massachusetts, all persons without distinction of age or sex, birth 
or color, origin or condition, are equal before the law * * *.”
This principle is at least as broad as the equal protection of the laws 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court, through Chief Justice Shaw, held:
“But, when this great principle comes to be applied to the actual 
and various conditions of persons in society, it will not warrant the 
assertion, that men and women are legally clothed with the same 
civil and political powers, and that children and adults are legally 
to have the same functions and be subject to the same treatment; 
but only that the rights of all, as they are settled and regulated by 
law, are equally entitled to the paternal consideration and protec­
tion of the law for their maintenance and security.”
The Court there held that the powers of the committee extended to 
the establishment of separate schools for children of different ages, sexes, 
and colors, and that they might also establish special schools for poor 
and neglected children, who have become too old to attend the primary 
school, and yet have not acquired the rudiments of learning, to enable 
them to enter the ordinary schools.
The Fourteenth Amendment was declared adopted July 28, 1868. The 
Congress had already established separate schools for the colored pu­
pils in the District of Columbia, Carr v. Corning, 182 F. (2d) 14, and 
during Congressional consideration of the resolution proposing the
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Fourteenth Amendment the Congress enacted measures dealing with 
the separate schools for the two races in the District [14 Stat. 343 
(1866) ; 14 Stat. 216 (1866)]. In 1874, as a part of the Revised Stat­
utes for the District of Columbia, the Congress provided for separate 
schools in the District [Sections 281 and 282 of Revised Statutes Re­
lating to the District of Columbia, U. S. Gov. Printing Office, 1875], 
and the legislation presently in force provides for separate schools in 
the District [District of Columbia Code (1940 Ed.), Section 31-1110, 
1111, 1112, 1113]. After the Fourteenth Amendment, the Congress con­
sistently refused to include the public schools in the Civil Rights legis­
lation [cf. 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 3270, 3734, 3735; 43rd Cong., 2nd 
Sess., pp. 997, 1010, 1011], although a number of efforts were made to 
include such schools therein.
After the Fourteenth Amendment became effective, a number of 
State Court decisions were rendered on the question whether separate 
public schools for the white and colored races denied rights safeguarded 
by the equal protection of the laws clause in that Amendment.
In 1871, the statutory provision of Ohio regarding separate schools 
was challenged as being in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In State ex rel. Carnes v. McCann, 21 Oh. St. 198, the Court held:
“Unquestionably all doubts, wheresoever they existed, as to the 
citizenship of colored persons, and their right to the ‘equal pro­
tection of the laws,’ are settled by this amendment. But neither 
of these was denied to them in this State before the adoption of the 
amendment. At all events, the statutes classifying the youth of the 
State for school purposes on the basts of color, and the decisions 
of this court in relation thereto, were not at all based on a denial 
that colored persons were citizens, or that they are entitled to the 
equal protection of the laws. It would seem, then, that these pro­
visions of the amendment contain nothing conflicting with the stat­
ute authorizing the classification in question, nor the decisions here­
tofore made touching the point in controversy in this case.
“ * * * conceding that the 14th amendment not only pro­
vides equal securities for all, but guarantees equality of rights to 
the citizens of a State, as one of the privileges of citizens of the 
United States, it remains to be seen whether this privilege has been 
abridged in the case before us. The law in question surely does not 
attempt to deprive colored persons of any rights. On the contrary 
it recognizes their right, under the constitution of the State, to
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equal common school advantages, and secures to them their equal 
proportion of the school fund. I t only regulates the mode and man­
ner in which this right shall he enjoyed by all classes of persons. 
The regulation of this right arises from the necessity of the case. 
Undoubtedly it should be done in a manner to promote the best 
interests of all. But this task must, of necessity, be left to the wis­
dom and discretion of some proper authority. The people have 
committed it to the general assembly, and the presumption is that 
it has discharged its duty in accordance with the best interests of all.
“At most, the 14th amendment only affords to colored citizens 
an additional guaranty of equality of rights to that already secured 
by the constitution of the State.
“The question, therefore, under consideration is the same that 
has, as we have seen, been heretofore determined in this State, that 
a classification of the youth of the State for school purposes, upon 
any basis which does not exclude either class from equal school ad­
vantages, is no infringement of the equal rights of citizens secured 
by the constitution of the State.” (Emphasis added.)
In 1872, in People ex rel Dietz v. Boston, 13 Abb. (N. Y.) Pr. 
(N. S.) 159, the New York court held that, under a statute providing 
for separate equal schools, excluding colored pupils from schools pro­
vided for white pupils did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
In 1873 the Pennsylvania court, in upholding a statute providing for 
separate schools, said in Commonwealth v. Williamson, 30 Legal Int. 
(Pa.) 406:
“In the case before us, we fail to discover that any great consti­
tutional question is involved, or that any right of the relator, or 
his children, growing out of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States, or under the Civil Rights Bill, 
has been challenged, invaded or denied. * * *” (Emphasis
added.)
In 1874, in Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind., 327, the Indiana court held that 
separate schools did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, observ­
ing with reference to the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend­
ments :
“In our opinion, such amendments have not in any other respect 
imposed restrictions or limitations upon the sovereign power of 
the State. From this it results that there is no limitation upon
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the power of the State, within the limits of her own constitution, 
to fix, secure, and protect the rights, privileges, and immunities of 
her citizens, as such, of whatever race or color they may be, so 
as to secure her own interned peace, prosperity, and happiness.
“In our opinion, the classification of scholars, on the basis of race 
or color and their education in separate schools, involve questions 
of domestic policy which are within the legislative discretion and 
control, and do not amount to an exclusion of either class.
“The action of Congress, at the same session at which the four­
teenth amendment was proposed to the States, and at a session 
subsequent to the date of its ratification, is worthy of consideration 
as evidencing the concurrent and after-matured conviction o a 
body that there was nothing whatever in the amendment which 
prevented Congress from separating the white and colored races 
and placing them, as classes, in different schools, and that such 
separation was highly proper and conducive to the well-being of the 
races, and calculated to secure the peace, harmony, and welfare of 
the public; and if no obligation was expected to be or was imposed 
upon Congress by the amendment, to place the two races and colors 
in the same school, with what show of reason can it be pretended 
that it has such a compelling power upon the sovereign and in­
dependent states forming the Federal Union
“We refer to the legislation of Congress relative to schools in 
the District of Columbia, at the first session of the Thirty-Ninth 
Congress, and the third session of the Forty-Second Congress. 
(Emphasis added.)
The Indiana court then review congressional legislation on separate 
schools in the District of Columbia, and said:
“This legislation of Congress continues in force, at the present 
time, as a legislative construction of the fourteenth amendment, 
and as a legislative declaration of what was thought to be lawful, 
proper, and expedient under such amendment, by the same body 
that proposed such amendment to the states for their approval and
ratification.”
Also in 1874 the California Supreme Court had occasion to decide 
whether a statute providing separate schools violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment, in Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36. The Court said:
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“ * * * nor do we discover that the statute is, in any of its
provisions, obnoxious to objections of a constitutional character. 
It provides in substance that schools shall be kept open for the 
admission of white children, and that the education of children of 
African descent must be provided for in separate schools.”
And further:
“ * * * our duties lie wholly within the such narrowed range
of determining whether this statute, in whatever motive it originat­
ed, denies to the petitioner, in a constitutional sense, the equal pro­
tection of the laws; and in the circumstances that the races are 
separated in the public schools, there is certainly to be found no 
violation of the constitutional rights of the one race more than the 
other, and we see none of either, for each, though separated from 
the other, is to be educated upon equal terms with that other, and 
both at the common public expense.” (Emphasis added.)
In Bertonneau v. Board of Directors, 3 Fed. Cases 294, decided in 
1878, the Court held:
“Is there any denial of equal rights in the resolution of the board 
of directors of the city schools, or in the action of the subordinate 
officers of the schools, and set out in the bill? Both races are treated 
precisely alike. White children and colored children are compelled 
to attend different schools. That is all. The state, while conceding 
equal privileges and advantages to both races, has the right to 
manage its schools in the manner which, in its judgment, will best 
promote the interest of all.
“The state may be of opinion that it is better to educate the 
sexes separately, and therefore establishes schools in which the 
children of different sexes are educated apart. By such a policy 
can it be said that the equal rights of either sex are invaded ? Equal­
ity of right does not involve the necessity of educating children of 
both sexes, or children without regard to their attainments or age 
in the same school. Any classification which preserves substantially 
equal school advantages does not impair any rights, and is not pro­
hibited by the constitution of the United States. Equality of right 
does not necessarily imply identity of rights.” (Emphasis 
added.)
In People ex rel King v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438, decided in 1883, 
the validity of the separation of white and colored pupils in the public 
schools was before the court, and it was held:
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“The highest authority for the interpretation of this amendment 
is afforded by the action of those sessions of Congress which not 
only immediately preceded, but were also contemporaneous with 
the adoption of the amendment in question.” (The court then dis­
cusses several Acts of Congress on the District of Columbia.)
“If regard be had to that established rule for the construction of 
statutes and constitutional enactments which require courts, in giv­
ing them effect, to regard the intent of the law-making power, it 
is difficult to see why the considerations suggested are not controll­
ing upon the question under discussion.
“The question here presented has also been the subject of much 
discussion and consideration in the courts of the various States of 
the Union, and it is believed has been, when directly adjudicated 
upon, uniformly determined in favor of the proposition that the 
separate education of the white and colored races is no abridgement 
of the rights of either” (Emphasis added.)
And further:
“The argument of the appellant’s counsel, which is founded upon 
that clause of the Constitutional amendment granting to every citizen 
the equal protection of the law, must fall with, his main argument as 
being founded upon the unwarranted assumption that this protection 
has been denied to the relator in this case. Equality and not identity of 
privileges and rights is what is guaranteed to the citizen, and this we 
have seen the relator enjoy.”
See also:
State v. Grubbs (1882), 85 Ind. 213;
State v. Gray (1884), 93 Ind. 303;
Dallas v. Fosdick (1869), 40 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 249;
State v. Board of Education (1876), 7 Oh. Dec. 129;
Maddox v. Neal (1885), 45 Ark. 121;
Chrisman v. Town of Brookhaven (1893), 70 Miss. 477;
Lehew v. Brummell (1891, Me.), 15 S. W. 785;
McMillan v. School Committee {1890), 107 N. C. 609;
Puitt v. Gaston Co. (1886), 94 N. C. 709.
In 1896, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 E. Ed. 256, and held that 
a state statute requiring separate railway coaches for white and colored 
passengers on intrastate trains did not deny equal protection of the 
laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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The question there presented was a more difficult question than that 
presented in the separate schools cases. Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 
78, 48 S. Ct. 91, 72 L. Ed. 172.
The Court relied upon the analogy of the school cases, and the state 
court decisions and congressional action in reference to separate schools 
in the District of Columbia under the Fourteenth Amendment, to sus­
tain the classification under that amendment.
The Court said:
“The object of the (14th) Amendment was undoubtedly to en­
force the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in 
the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish dis­
tinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished 
from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon 
terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and even requiring, 
their separation in places where they are liable to be brought into 
contact do not ncessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the 
other, and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as 
within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of 
their police power. The most common instance of this is connected 
with the establishment of separate schools for white and colored 
children, which has been held to be a valid exercise of the legisla­
tive power even by courts of states where the political rights of the 
colored race have been longest and most earnestly enforced. * * *” 
(Emphasis added.)
The Court also held that in determining the question of the rea­
sonableness of the exercise of a State’s legislative power “there must 
necessarily be a large discretion on the part of the legislature,” and 
that “it is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages, 
customs and traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion 
of their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good 
order.”
The Court rejected as unfounded the argument that the enforced 
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of 
inferiority, and observed:
“The argument also assumes that social prejudices may be 
overcome by legislation, and that equal rights cannot be secured 
to the negro except by an enforced commingling of the two races. 
We cannot accept this proposition. If the two races are to meet
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upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of natural 
affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other’s merits and a vol­
untary consent of individuals. As was said by the Court of Ap­
peals of New York in People v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438, 448, 
‘this end can neither he accomplished nor promoted by laws which 
conflict with the general sentiment of the community upon whom 
they are designed to operate. When the goernment, therefore, has 
secured to each of its citizens equal rights before the law and equal 
opportunities for improvement and progress, it has accomplished 
the end for which it was organized and performed all of the func­
tions respecting social advantages with which it is endowed!  Legis­
lation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish dis­
tinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do 
so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present sit­
uation. If the civil and political rights of both races be equal one 
cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically.” (Emphasis 
added.)
It should be observed that the administrative practice of assigning the 
white and the colored pupils to separate schools did not originate with, 
and does not depend upon Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, for its validity. 
The question had been settled by many courts and by the Congress un­
der the 14th Amendment years before Plessy v. Ferguson reached the 
Supreme Court. Such administrative practice was the “common in­
stance” of separating the two races which the Court used as a recog­
nized, settled and accepted analogy in support of the classification up­
held in Plessy v. Ferguson.
Mr. Justice Harlan dissented in Plessy v. Ferguson, and his dissent 
is always referred to in attacks made upon the authority of that deci­
sion. It cannot logically be used, however, to challenge the validity of 
separate schools for the two races under the 14th Amendment, for Mr. 
Justice Harlan himself showed clearly in later decisions that he rec­
ognized a difference in cases of separation involving State public schools.
In Cumming v. Board of Education, 175 U. S. 526, 20 S. Ct. 197, 
44 L. Ed. 262, a case brought under the 14th Amendment, he wrote 
the opinion of the Court, in which he stated:
“ * * * the education of the people in schools maintained by
state taxation is a matter belonging to the respective States, and 
any interference on the part of Federal authority with the manage­
ment of such schools cannot be justified except in the case of a clear
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and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the supreme law of 
the land.”
And in Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45, 29 S. Ct. 33, 53 E. 
Ed. 81, in which the Court held that the State could, without violating 
the 14th Amendment, prohibit the teaching of white and colored stu­
dents together in the same private school or college, Mr. Justice Harlan, 
in his dissenting opinion, said:
“Of course what I have said has no reference to regulations pre­
scribed for public schools, established at the pleasure of the State 
and maintained at the public expense.”
The question of the power of a State through its legislature to require 
separate public schools under the 14th Amendment was expressly rec­
ognized by the Court in Gong L,um v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78, 48 S. Ct. 91, 
72 L. Ed. 172, as having long since been set at rest. There the Court, 
in a unanimous decision delivered by Chief Justice Taft, after quoting 
the references to separate schools in Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, held:
“ * * * we think that it is the same question which has been
many times decided to be within the constitutional power of the 
state legislature to settle without intervention of the federal courts 
under the Federal Constitution.”
And further:
“The right and power of the state to regulate the method of pro­
viding for the education of its youth at public expense is clear* 
* * *
“The Decision is within the discretion of the State in regulating 
its public schools and does not conflict with the Fourteenth Amend­
ment.” (Emphasis added.)
The Court which decided that case, in addition to Chief Justice Taft, 
was composed of Justice Holmes, Van Devanter, Brandeis, Stone, Mc- 
Reynolds, Sutherland, Butler and Sanford.
In Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337, 59 S. Ct. 232, 
83 L. Ed. 208, the Court, in a law school case, said that the State had 
sought to fulfill its recognized obligation to provide Negroes with ad­
vantages for higher education substantially equal to the advantages af­
forded for white students “by furnishing equal facilities in separate 
schools, a method the validity of which has been sustained by our de­
cisions.”
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The validity of such method was again recognized in Sipuel v. Board 
of Regents, 332 U. S. 631, 68 S. Ct. 299, 92 L. Ed. 247, and in Fisher 
v. Hurst, 333 U. S. 147, 68 S. Ct. 389, 92 L. Ed. 604; and the Court 
expressly refrained from re-examining the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, 
supra, in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629, 70 S. Ct. 848, 94 L. Ed. —, 
although urged to do so. Cf. Boyer v. Garrett, 183 F. (2d) 582.
Since the decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, the courts of Ala­
bama, Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, the District of Columbia, Florida, 
Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, 
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Ten­
nessee, Virginia, and West Virginia have upheld the constitutionality of 
State regulations prescribing separate schools.
In People v. School Board of Queens (1900) 161 N. Y. 598, 56 N. 
E. 81, upholding the right “to maintain separate schools for the educa­
tion of colored children,” the Court said:
“If the legislature determined that it was wise for one class of 
pupils to be educated by themselves, there is nothing in the con­
stitution to deprive it of the right to so provide. I t  was the facili­
ties for and the advantages of an education that it was required 
to furnish to all the children, and not that it should provide for 
them any particular class of associates while such education was 
being obtained. * * *” (Emphasis added.)
And in State ex rel Weaver v. Board of Trustees of Ohio State Univ. 
(1933) 126 Ch. St. 290, 185 N. E. 196, the Court, in a case where 
an equivalent home economics course was offered to a Negro applicant, 
held that
“The respondents had full authority to prescribe regulations that will 
prove most beneficial to the university and state and will best conserve, 
promote, and secure the educational advantages of all races. The purely 
social relations of our citizens cannot be enforced by law ; nor were they 
intended to be regulated by our own laws or by the state and Federal 
Constitutions.” (Emphasis added.)
There are state court decisions holding separate schools invalid under 
state constitutional or statutory provisions, such as State v. Duffy, 7 
Nev. 342; Clark v. Board of Directors, 24 Iowa 266; People v. Board 
of Education, 18 Mich. 400; Chase v. Stephenson, 71 111. 383; Smith v. 
Board of Directors, 40 Iowa 518; and Dove v. Ind. School Dist., 41 
Iowa 689. But we have failed to discover any decision, Federal or State,
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in the period immediately after the adoption of the 14th Amendment 
or since then, or any action of the Congress, which casts any doubt 
upon the right of a State in regulating its public schools to provide sep­
arate schools for the pupils of the white and the colored races.
Provisions for separate schools are by nature administrative regu­
lations, adopted in the light of considerations which a State or its school 
authorities may properly take into account in arranging for the efficient 
functioning of the State’s public schools, the best interests of the schools, 
of the state, and of the educational advantages of the two races alike. 
The State may act upon the question on the basis of administrative 
reality.
The authorities show that such regulations were a normal practice 
prior to the 14th Amendment, were followed in the District of Columbia 
by the Congress that debated and submitted the 14th Amendment to 
the States for ratification, and were observed by almost all of the States 
which now do not have such a regulation, until such times as their re­
spective legislatures determined that separate schools should no longer 
be provided in their public school systems.
Under the authorities, State regulations prescribing separate schools 
in the State’s public school system would be valid even if pure police 
power measures such as these upheld in Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, and 
in Berea College v. Kentucky, supra, had been or were held invalid 
under the 14th Amendment. [Cf. Gong Lum v. Rice, supra; Mr. Jus­
tice Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Berea College v. Kentucky, supra.\
The decisions relied upon by the plaintiffs have no authoritative ap­
plication to the question. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 
836, 92 L. Ed. 1161, 3 A. L. R. (2d) 441, involved discrimination in 
the right to own and occupy property. So did Oyama v. California, 
332 U. S. 633, 68 S. Ct. 369, 92 L. Ed. 249. Hirabayashi v. United 
States, 320 U. S. 81, 63 S. Ct. 1375, 87 L. Ed. 1774, and Koramatsu 
v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 63 S. Ct. 193, 89 L. Ed. 194, involved 
orders excluding Japanese from certain areas in wartime. Nixon v. 
Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 47 S. Ct. 446, 71 L. Ed. 759, was a primary 
voting case. Steele v. L. & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192, 65 S. Ct. 226, 89 
L. Ed. 173, was a right to work case; cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. 
S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed., 220. Sweatt v. Painter, supra, was a 
professional school case. Henderson v. United States, 339 U. S. 816,
70 S. Ct. 843, 94 L. Ed. ____ , and Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.
S. 80, 61 S. Ct. 873, 85 L. Ed. 1201, involved unreasonable exclusion
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from interstate train facilities not occupied or in use. Chance v. Lam­
beth, 186 F. (2d) 379, and Whiteside v. Southern Bus Lines, 177 F. 
(2d) 949, involved burdens on interstate commerce. McLaurin v. Board 
of Regents, 339 U. S. 637, 70 S. Ct. 851, 94 L. E d .------, involved dis­
crimination in the only facility furnished to the student by the state. 
Rice v. Arnold, 71 S. Ct. 77, was sent back for reconsideration on the 
question of equality of facilities in relation to use of a publicly owned 
golf course.
In the oral argument counsel for the plaintiffs contended (p. 234) :
“The defendant (sic) hasn’t produced one single witness to show 
that that statute is a reasonable classification—not one. Not a wit­
ness has been produced to show that that statute came about as a 
result of mature judgment.”
The recorded history of South Carolina reveals clearly that the pro­
visions for separate schools came about after the State had had some 
12 years of experience with mixed schools in the period from 1865 to 
1877. The constitutional convention held in South Carolina in 1866 de­
bated the question of separate or mixed schools, and adopted a provi­
sion for the latter. We read of that convention’s action in Public Edu­
cation in the South, by Dr. Edgar W. Knight, Professor of Education in 
the University of North Carolina, published in 1922, at page 322, as 
follows:
“The debate concluded by the chairman of the committee, the 
Reverend E. L. Cardozo, a negro member who finally became treas­
urer of the State. He argued that the whole scheme of reconstruc­
tion was antagonistic to the wishes of South Carolina and that the 
mixed-school plan was a legitimate part of that scheme. Race prej­
udices could best be removed, he said, by forcing the white children 
and the negro children ‘to mingle in school together and to asso­
ciate generally.’ In some communities, however, it might be neces­
sary to provide separate schools, but for a few white children ‘to 
demand such separation would be absurd, and I hope that the con­
vention will give its consent to no such proposition.’ This was 
the final word on the subject in the convention, and the vote gave 
an overwhelming majority for the mixed-school section.
“Referring to this action of the convention in his message to the 
Legislature in July, Governor Orr, who was retiring from office, 
said that the provision for mixed schools was a reckless and dan­
gerous experiment and was not desired by the negroes or the whites,
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and if submitted to their decision the provision would have been 
completely repudiated by both. He noted also the causes for bicker­
ing and controversy already existing between the two people, and 
declared that ‘no greater cruelty could be inflicted by legislation 
upon the parents of the children of the two races, than that which 
is contemplated by this objectionable feature of the constitution.’ 
Governor Scott, who succeeded Orr, shared the latter’s opinion of 
the constitutional provision for mixed schools and likewise urged, in 
his message to the Legislature, the establishment of separate schools 
for the education of the children of the State. He believed the sep­
aration of the children in the public schools ‘a matter of the greatest 
importance to all classes of our people.’ ” Later he said:
“ ‘It is the declared design of the Constitution that all classes 
of our people shall be educated, but not to provide for this separa­
tion of the two races will be to repel the masses of the whites from 
the educational training that they so much need, and virtually to 
give our colored population the exclusive benefit of our public 
schools. Let us, therefore, recognize facts as they are and rely upon 
time and elevating influences of popular education to dispel any 
unjust prejudices that may exist among the two races of our fel­
low citizens.”
The unhappy result of the mixed-schools provision are thus sum­
marized in Dr. Knight’s article entitled “Reconstruction and Education 
in South Carolina,” which appeared in The South Atlantic Quarterly, 
Vol. XV III, No. 4, October, 1919, and Vol.XIX, No. 1, January, 1920: 
“The presence and influence of the negro in political, educational 
and social affairs also complicated an otherwise unhappy condition. 
Just how far the promoters of mixed school legislation excepted 
it to extend is a matter for conjecture, but that it was perhaps the 
most unwise action of the period is a certainty, lending itself to 
a most unfortunate and damaging reaction for many years after 
the return to home rule. The principal objection raised to the school 
system during this time arose from the fear of mixed schools, a 
provision which was not demanded by either race. On the con­
trary, both races were violently opposed to the scheme and the 
friends of the schools constantly urged the adoption of separate 
schools. But the agitation in Congress of the Civil Rights Bill in 
1872 had here, as in other southern states, the effect of aggravating a
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prejudice which had begun to develop with the state constitutional 
provision for mixed school.”
And further:
“It was many years, therefore, before confidence could be re­
stored and the principle of universal and free education could 
gather sufficient strength to give it wide acceptance and popular 
approval. Here, as in the other southern states, it has been diffi­
cult to recover from the ills inherited from the reconstruction prac­
tices following the close of the Civil War, and here, as elsewhere 
in that region, the stigma and the reproach of the indignities and 
the injustices of that period have been a deadly upas to the cause 
of public education. Only in recent years has recuperation been 
rapid enough to assure promise of a better day in public education.”
So much for the background of the adoption of the challenged pro­
visions. The propriety of the administrative practice of separate schools 
at the present time and under present conditions in South Carolina is 
fully sustained by the opinion and judgment of leading sociologists and 
educators who, unlike the witnesses for the plaintiffs, have the basis, in 
years of research, observation, and practical experience in states where 
the two races live in the same areas in great numbers, which validates 
and gives compelling substance to their informed judgment publicly ex­
pressed.
The witness, E. R. Crow, with years of experience as superintendent 
of the school affairs of Sumter, S. C. (having approximately 7,200 chil­
dren in its schools in the proportion of 53% white and 47% colored), 
testified that in the light of his experience as a school administrator, as­
suming that separate schools were neither commanded nor prohibited 
by law, and that the several schools of the school system afford substan­
tially equal educational facilities and opportunities, it would be unwise 
in administrative practice in his opinion to mix the two races in the 
same schools at the present time and under present conditions; that it 
would be impossible to have sufficient acceptance of the idea of mixed 
groups attending the same schools to have public education on that 
basis at all; that there would not be community acceptance of mixed 
schools at this time; that there would be a probability of violent emo­
tional reaction in the communities; that it would be impossible to have 
peaceable association of the races in the public schools ; and that it would 
éliminate the public schools in most, if not all, of the communities in the 
State. (R. 127, 128T
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Those who are familiar with local conditions in South Carolina know 
that Mr. Crow was not overstating the case. The reasons for such re­
sults are as yet deep rooted in the people of such a State as South Caro­
lina, and those reasons are indicated sociologically in some detail by 
Dr. Howard W. Odom, Kenan Professor of Sociology in the Univer­
sity of North Carolina, in a recent address delivered by him to the 
Southern Sociological Society in Atlanta, Ga., on April 27, 1951, en­
titled “The Mid-Century South: Looking Both Ways.” Dr. Odum’s 
years of research in the field of racial relations in the Southern states; 
his untiring efforts to bring about progress in that field; and his ac­
knowledged freedom from anything which could even remotely be sug­
gested as prejudice or preconceived approach to racial questions, are 
widely known; and it is believed that he is the best informed authority 
in the country on Southern racial matters and the considerations which 
must be taken into account in evaluating and dealing with them.
In his Atlanta address, Dr. Odum set forth what he termed “four main 
segments or levels calling for mature and quick action on a statesman­
like basis” in achieving the ultimate solution of the South’s racial 
problems:
“The first is to remedy the inexcusable situation with reference 
to brutalities, injustices, inequalities, and discrimination to which 
we have referred.
“The second is to set up what would currently be designated as 
‘Operation Equal Opportunity’ to comprehend all phases of public 
education.
“The third is to provide immediately for non-segregation in all 
university education on the graduate and professional level.
“The fourth is to move judiciously but speedily toward agenda 
for negotiations and specifications for future achievement on the 
total front.”
He said:
“First in the southern situation is the cumulative racial and con­
flict heritage that has gone into the architecture of all cultures, 
whether in the bi-racial South or in India, in Pakistan, in China, in 
all the way-places of Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and in un­
counted little culture islands of the Pacific; and in counted big na­
tions and little democracies of the western world. This heritage, 
which is basic to conflict and war, is also the very heart of group 
loyalties, patriotism and institutional solidarity, symbolic of the
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universal formula by which men convenant ‘for God, for country 
and for home/ The Southern culture structure rates the same 
diagnosis as any other.
“In the Southern situation is the same cumulative heritage 
which leads India’s powerful Nehru, as late as yesterday and in to­
morrow’s news, to beg for the preservation of world peace and world 
order with hope and faith, but with an appeal for character and pa­
tience. But he adds, ‘Anyway we can’t have it suddenly or by de­
cree. One has to grow up to it;’ and again, in what he terms ‘an 
unbelievable varied world’, he protests the quick ‘imposition of any 
form of foreign domination against the will of the people’, on the 
structural grounds that ‘no solution which is not accepted by large 
masses of the people can have any possible enduring quality.’ Nor 
could Nehru relish the stereotype designation of being caricatured 
as a ‘gradualist’, outmoded echo of superficial rationalization.”
He says further:
“The above agenda for equalizing educational opportunities ap­
plies to all levels of schooling and assumes the normal status and 
processes of segregation and non-segregation consistent with the 
development and administration of educational systems everywhere. 
It assumes a certain inevitable continuity of the sub system featur­
ing primarily segregation in the public schools but with both non­
segregation and segregation modes and privileges in institutions of 
higher learning. This is necessary to insure equality of opportunity 
for the extraordinary Negro institutions, teachers, students, and 
administrative officers in ways which will give maximum recog­
nition and opportunity for Negro professional folk and students.”
After urging immediate ending of segregation in graduate and pro­
fessional schools, he stated:
“That this is a structurally different situation from elementary 
and secondary schools, in the framework of America’s private, re­
ligious, and public school system will be as manifest to the courts 
as it is to the executive and legislative units of government and to 
the practical administrative constituency of American education.”
He warned:
“If there are those who hold that the South, having too many 
people of both races anyway, would profit by a certain amount of 
violent revolution, and slaughter of the people, as I have heard
22 H arry Briggs, J r., et al., P laintiffs, v.
prominent metropolitan leaders say, that might be a democratic 
prerequisite; but to urge the Supreme Court to set the incidence 
of such a conflict is something else.”
And further:
“Anyone who is not naive enough to try to repeal the laws of in­
dividuation, of personalty, of freedom, of opportunity, or classifica­
tion, knows that the major construct is not segregation or non­
segregation but non-segregation and segregation, developed through 
total processes of interaction and of growth, of means and ends, 
of moral imperatives and administrative reality.”
Finally, as to the conversion of the “Southern compound bi-racial 
culture to an American complex integrated multicultured society”, Dr. 
Odom says:
“Such a conversion brings with it no more compulsion or speci­
fications for negating the facets of race and ethnic minorities, su­
preme in whatever personality and cultural loyalties they may wish. 
Such a conversion automatically, as in any organic structure or 
process, carries with it the inevitable continuity of separateness, au­
tonomy, and segregation inherent in not only the American ideal 
but in all the newer reaches of social science, philosophy, freedom 
for all the differential-groups to have a say in how they shall in­
tegrate themselves into the new world society.”
Another distinguished educator and outstanding liberal, Dr. Frank 
P. Graham, formerly President of the University of North Carolina, and 
one qualified to express an informed judgment on the racial matters 
facing the Southern states, had this to say in an address delivered April 
9, 1951, to a joint assembly of the North Carolina legislature at the un­
veiling of the portrait of Governor Charles B. Aycock:
“In view of the origin, history, and power of the ‘mores’ of peo­
ples based on the universal consciousness of kind, an historic social 
heritage, the degree of the visibility of the difference between races, 
the largeness of the members of the groups involved and the eco­
nomic competition of the low income groups, there is needed a new 
emphasis on the influence of religion, education, personal kindness, 
decent respect for the human dignity of persons, and voluntary co­
operation of people of good will for better relations in the local com­
munities, in the long haul of the generations for justice on this 
earth. To our good Northern friends, I emphasize the unwisdom
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of using federal legislation and force at educational levels beyond 
the levels of acceptance by the people in the States. Such unwise 
compulsions cause bitter set-backs not enduring progress which 
mainly comes from within the minds and hearts of the majority of 
the people in the States.”
In an address entitled “Justice and Opportunity”, made November 
28,1950, to the Southern Governors’ Conferences at Charleston, Pres­
ident Colgate W. Darden, Jr., of the University of Virginia, after ac­
knowledging that separate facilities were too often not equal and ad­
vocating constructive effort toward the speedy solution of the South’s 
racial problems, said:
“The Southern people are overwhelmingly opposed, in my opin­
ion, to mixed public schools. * * * This is not difficult to un­
derstand. People feel quite differently about young children, and 
they are not willing to make the concessions as to their education 
that they are willing to make in the cases of those who are more 
mature. To undertake to set up mixed public schools in the face 
of this sentiment would be to open up a fostering wound that would 
sap our strength and destroy that unity without which there is no 
hope for substantial progress for either race in the South.”
Hodding Carter recently wrote (Equality in America: the Issue of 
Minority Rights. Compiled by George B. de Ruszar. The Reference 
Shelf, Vol. 21, No. 3, page 101) :
“It will be tragic for the South, the Negro and the nation itself 
if the government should enact and attempt to enforce any laws or 
Supreme Court decisions that would open the South’s public 
schools and public gathering places to the Negro. The one saving 
factor in such an event would be the southern Negro’s own com­
mon-sense refusal to implement the law. * * *
“The Southern Negro, by and large, does not want an end to 
segregation in itself any more than does the southern white man. 
The Negro in the South knows that discriminations, and worse, 
can and would multiply in such event. He knows that these things 
which he does want—the vote, educational opportunities and the 
rest—are more readily attainable in a South that is not aroused 
against federal intervention in the field of segregation. * *
In Myrdal, “An American Dilemma”, Chapter 41, “The Negro 
School”, Section 6, it is stated:
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“Negroes are divided on the issue of segregated schools. In so 
far as segregation means discrimination and is a badge of Negro 
inferiority, they are against it, although many Southern Negroes 
would not take an open stand that would anger Southern whites. 
Some Negroes, however, prefer the segregated school, even for the 
North, when the mixed school involves humiliation for Negro stu­
dents and discrimination against Negro teachers. Du Bois has ex­
pressed this point of view succinctly:
“ ‘ * * * theoretically, the Negro needs neither segregated
schools nor mixed schools. What he needs is Education. What he 
must remember is that there is no magic, either in mixed schools 
or in segregated schools. A mixed school with poor and unsympa­
thetic teachers, with hostile opinion, and no teaching concerning 
black folk, is bad. A segregated school with ignorant placeholders, 
inadequate equipment, poor salaries, and wretched housing, is equal­
ly bad. Other things being equal, the mixed school is the broader, 
more natural, basis for the education of all youth. It gives wider 
contacts; it inspires greater self-confidence; and suppresses the in­
feriority complex. But other things seldom are equal, and in that 
case, sympathy, knowledge, and the Truth, outweigh all that the 
mixed school can offer.’
“Other Negroes prefer the mixed schools at any cost, since for 
them it is a matter of principle or since they believe that it is a 
means of improving race relations.”
In a survey prepared for the U. S. Department of Education on higher 
education of Negroes by Dr. Ambrose Caliver, a Negro who was senior 
Specialist on Negro Education in the U. S. Office of Education from 
1930 to 1945, it is stated:
“In some of the States the mores of racial relationships are such 
as to rule out, for the present at least, any possibility of admit­
ting white persons and Negroes to the same institutions. * * *” 
Vol. II Misc. No. 6, p. 17, National Survey of Higher Education 
for Negroes.
The evidence adduced by the plaintiffs from the psychology, educa­
tion and anthropology witnesses called by them to the stand affords no 
basis in law or in fact for impugning the power of the State, in its con­
stitution and in its legislative enactments, to deal with its public school 
system, and make regulations assigning the two races to separate pub­
lic schools for the purpose of their education. Such evidence, like the
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quotations made above from the general learning and informed judg­
ment on the subject, would be properly for legislative consideration, but 
not a basis for a court decision invalidating such legislation.
The witness McNally, an associate professor of education, expressed 
the view that, in modern conceptions of education, all the experiences a 
child has in the school constitute his education (R. 67), and that the 
purpose of education in a country such as ours, a Democracy, is to de­
velop in each individual a real meaning for the phrase “respect for per­
sonalities” or “respect for individualities, and respect for others,” that 
the public schools are about the only institutions' in the United States 
where children of all circumstances, levels, beliefs, races, and colors 
come together for instruction, and that separate schools “short change” 
children of both races in that they have no opportunity to learn to value 
each other and one another as individuals (R. 68).
This witness admitted that he had never made a study of any school 
system in South Carolina, in any other Southern state, or in any state 
which by law has separate schools for the two races, and had made no 
inquiry into the factors and problems which have motivated these states 
in establishing separate schools.
It is obvious that the State has the power to provide a system of 
education in its public schools for the purpose of instruction in reading, 
writing and arithmetic, and other subjects of education, and is not re­
quired to adopt any theory of education which seeks to employ its schools 
as agencies of social adjustment and personality development.
If the State had to provide its schools on such a basis or forego the 
public schools, it would logically have to go further in eliminating sep­
arate schools and also eliminate religious and private schools, requir­
ing all pupils to attend its public school system. That this would be be­
yond the power of the State under the 14th Amendment is established 
by Pierce, Governor of Oregon et al. v. Society of Sisters, and Pierce, 
Governor of Oregon v. Hill Military Academy, 268 U. S. 510, 45 S. 
Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070, 39 A. L. R. 468.
The witness Knox also approached the matter in the light of the over­
all objective for preparing children to become members of the human 
race and not distinct races as such, and in the light of “our American 
Democracy” and on the theory that segregation cannot exist without 
discrimination disadvantageous to the minority group (R. 74). This 
witness admitted that the ways of life and emotionalisms must be taken
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into account, and also that he had nothing but hearsay information as 
to the situation in School Disrict No. 22.
The witness Clark, an assistant professor of phychology, testified to 
a certain doll test devised by him and his wife which was used on 16 
colored children in the schools of School District No. 22 whose names 
were furnished him on a list previously prepared by a representative 
of the N. A. A. C. P., and his o'ral questioning of some 10 older col­
ored pupils. The method used had been actually used on only about 400 
pupils in widely scattered places prior to the witness’ visit to Clarendon 
County. He drew some psychological conclusions from its application 
to 16 pupils, directed to the existence of race consciousness in the chil­
dren, and that “discrimination, prejudice and segregation have definitely 
detrimental effects on the personality development of the Negro chil­
dren.” (R. 86.)
It is difficult to believe that the plaintiffs would expect weight to be 
given to this witness’ testimony, with no other research or inquiry into 
the situation in School District No. 22 or elsewhere than he has made, 
according to his testimony. It is not without significance that the wit­
ness Mrs. Helen Trager, who testified to a study made by her of some 
250 white and colored pupils in the Philadelphia schools, stated that 
she found 5 year old school children of both races had racial conscious­
ness and racial prejudice obviously developed in the homes (R. 173; 
174, 181), and this in a community which does not have separate schools 
or segregation laws, and does have a Civil Rights Law.
Dean Hupp’s evidence is obviously of no weight in the instant case, 
first because he is talking about education at college level, and secondly 
because he has made no research and investigation into conditions pre­
vailing in a state like South Carolina or a section like Clarendon County, 
and did not undertake to qualify himself as an expert on questions af­
fecting public schools.
Of the witness Kesselmann, counsel for the plaintiffs rather aptly 
stated that the other witnesses be expected to call are “REAL” scientists, 
and it is obvious from this witness’ evidence that his statements were 
purely theoretical.
The witness Krech, a professor of social psychology, gave his opinion 
of legal segregation in general, based upon what he had read on the 
subject, with no practical research of his own into the matter in a state 
which had legal segregation.
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With reference to the testimony of the witnesses Clarke and Krech, 
it is well known that psychology is not accepted as a science, and hence 
the opinions of psychology witnesses are of no probative value apart 
from the extent and degree of their actual practical research and in­
vestigation, on a basis broad enough to support a conclusion carrying 
weight.
Reference has already been made to the testimony of the witness 
Mrs. Helen Träger. She has made no study herself in a state having 
separate schools, but concedes that emotional conflict between the races 
and frustrations and aggressions do arise between the white and colored 
races where they live together in the same area in great numbers 
(R.176), and agreed with DeBois that what the Negro needs is edu­
cation, and that what he must remember is that there is no magic either 
in mixed schools or in segregated schools from his standpoint. (R. 177.)
The testimony of Dr. Redfield, a professor of anthropology, taken 
in the case of Sweatt v. Painter, supra, was largely referable to educa- 
cation in graduate and professional school levels. He testified (R. 210) 
that he thinks that in every community there is some segregation that 
can be changed at once, and that the area of higher education is the 
most favorable for making the change. He also said (R. 211) what he 
thinks that the steps by which, and the rapidity with which, segregation 
in education can be removed with benefits to the public welfare will 
vary with the circumstances, and that the circumstances of the com­
munity and how long there has been segregation will have a bearing 
on it. He also testified (R. 212) that he knows from history that the 
attempt to force the abolition of segregation in the South did not work, 
and that he feels that the social attitudes and beliefs of the people in 
that day, of both races, had some bearing on whether it would or would 
not work. He said (R. 215) that he recognizes some limit to his theory 
of abolition of segregation, and he indicated a limit, which “will be 
defined in a particular conclusion as the particular circumstances.” 
He stated (R. 223-224) that the attitudes of the community are complex, 
and that in considering what is best to be done for the individual in the 
community, the community attitude of both races should be considered.
As above suggested, all of the considerations advanced by the wit­
nesses for the plaintiffs, as well as all of the general learning and infor­
mation on the subject, could properly be taken into account by the 
Legislature in determining its policy on the question whether separate 
or mixed schools should be prescribed in its public school system. There
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is disagreement among authorities on the subject; Dr. Redfield’s testi­
mony indicated this. The fact that there is disagreement and difference 
of opinion on the proper approach to efficient administration of the 
public school system at the present time and under conditions presently 
prevailing in race relations in South Carolina and in Clarendon County, 
does not serve to invalidate the State’s constitutional and legislative 
action in the light of the considerations and information available to it. 
The showing indicates clearly that the Legislature had to make the 
choice of the kind of public school system it would operate, and the 
purposes of that system, and also its administrative requirements in re­
spect to separate or mixed schools, and disagreement among the au­
thorities supports the propriety of the legislative choice, instead of 
weakening it.
The situation is different from the Texas and Oklahoma law school 
cases. There graduate and professional schools were involved. The num­
ber and age of the students was very different. In the Texas case it was 
held not only that the separate facilities were not equal, but that under 
the peculiar requirements of the study of law it was impossible to make 
them equal. In the Oklahoma case there was discrimination and dif­
ference of treatment in the only facility provided by the state.
The public school system stands on a different basis. The witness 
Crow pointed out that mixed groups in graduate courses are quite a 
different thing from the mixing of public school pupils of all ages in 
the public schools, because few people are involved in graduate courses, 
they are on a mature level, and a college is removed from the community, 
whereas the public schools are right in the community affected (R. 135).
The plaintiffs’ counsel himself, in his argument, candidly granted 
that there is a difference between university and college levels and ele­
mentary and high school levels. He said that he agreed that there is a 
difference, and “of course there is a difference.”
It is respectfully submitted that the power of the State through its 
Constitutional Convention and Legislature, in establishing a system of 
free public schools, to assign to different schools the children of the 
two races living in great numbers in the same area and under the ad­
ministrative conditions to be faced in the operation of such schools, 
has never been held to contravene the 14th Amendment, and should be 
sustained.
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A s to Appropriate Relief
This being an action for a declaratory judgment, it is in the equitable 
jurisdiction of the Court.
“A declaratory judgment, like other forms of equitable relief, 
should be granted only as a matter of judicial discretion, exercised 
in the public interest * * * It is always the duty of a court
of equity to strike a proper balance between the needs of the plain­
tiff and the consequences of giving the desired relief. Especially 
where governmental action is involved, courts should not intervene 
unless the need for equitable relief is clear, not remote or 
speculative.”
Bccles v. Peoples Bank, etc., 333 U. S. 426, 68 S. Ct. 614, 92 L. Ed. 
784.
The defendants in the instant case have conceded on the record that 
inequalities exist in respect to the educational facilities and opportunities 
provided for colored pupils as compared with those furnished for white 
pupils in the district. The inequalities are not entirely one way, how­
ever, for the evidence shows that the white elementary school is in a 
bad state of repair, and practically beyond repair (R. 152), with poor 
lighting, while the colored 12 grade school has better lighting (R. 152), 
and, with improvements, approved and efficient education can be given 
in it (R. 57).
The evidence indicates clearly the necessity, either in School District 
No. 22, or in a district formed by consolidation of the five school dis­
tricts, of a capital construction program as the means of and requisite 
to the development of improved educational opportunities for all the 
pupils of the district or districts.
It would be a physical impossibility, under the evidence, to follow the 
suggestion of the plaintiffs in the complaint that the colored pupils be 
admitted to the white schools, in an effort to eliminate existing inequal­
ities. The white school buildings provided for 277 enrolled pupils can­
not accommodate either the 866 enrolled colored pupils, or the 1,143 
white and colored pupils, now attending the district’s schools. Nor would 
the operation of all of the district’s schools on a mixed basis bring about 
equality, even if permitted under the Constitution and Statutes of the 
State. This would only amount to an effort to achieve equal protection 
of the laws “through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities.” Cf
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Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 22, 68 S. Ct. 836, 846, 92 L. Ed. 1161, 
2 A. L. R. (2d) 441.
The end to be attained is education, and this lies within the domain 
of State functions. The State of South Carolina, by its 1951 legislation, 
has declared that equality of educational opportunity for all children 
throughout the State shall be provided. It has set up a Statewide 
program of capital construction and equipping of school physical 
facilities, with adequate financial resources made available to school 
districts, under State supervision and control. School District No. 22, 
under the evidence, will be enabled to expand its physical facilities on 
a large scale, in comparison with its present facilities. Its trustees have 
already acted to avail themselves of the resources provided by the 1951 
Act. They declare their intention to employ every resource at their 
command to bring about equality of facilities and educational advantages. 
Nothing appears which would lead the Court to discount their good 
faith.
The carrying out of the State’s 1951 educational construction program 
will bring about striking improvement in the education of both races 
alike in rural areas such as the school district here involved. The record 
is replete with evidence of the importance to proper teaching and in­
struction of physical facilities and equipment.
It is respectfully submitted that it is in the public interest, and in the 
interest of better education of all of the children of South Carolina, that 
the Court, in its discretion, pass a decree which will permit the 1951 
building program to be fully and efficiently carried out by the trustees. 
The Court is as much entitled to use its equitable discretion in the 
action which it takes in a declaratory judgment suit as it is in enter­
taining the suit.
Construction takes time. The legal rights of the plaintiffs are fully 
recognized, and the trustees are moving to accord them in full measure. 
They will be enabled to do so if adequate time is given to them by the 
Court’s decree. Too limited a time may put it beyond their power to 
develop fully and efficiently the physical facilities which the educational 
requirements of the district and its pupils make necessary. The proper 
development of the district’s educational advantages will bring about 
the better education of the pupils, which is a prerequisite to the improve­
ment of racial relations and the solution of the State’s racial problems.
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The State of South Carolina has actually implemented the program 
of achieving educational equality advocated by such leaders as President 
Darden and Dr. Odum. It is leading the way in what the latter called 
“Operation Equal Opportunity.” The State’s program will result in the 
building up of the school systems of the districts of the State, and better 
education for the school children of both races. School District No. 22 
is a good example of the benefits and improvements which will be 
brought about if it can be carried through. It is hoped that, in the cause 
of better education, the Court in its discretion will pass an order which 
will allow the construction program to be formulated and carried out 
in the school district, so that an increase in educational opportunities, 
rather than an otherwise inevitable deterioration of such opportunities, 
will be brought about in the school district.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully, submit that the case is one which should appeal with 
peculiar force to the discretion of the Chancellor, and that the public 
interest and welfare will be best served by action which makes possible 
the efficient carrying out of the program to build up the public school 
system of the State which was advocated by Governor Byrnes in his 
Inaugural Address and in his message to the General Assembly; which 
was enacted as recommended by him; and which will be carried out 
under his continued leadership as Chairman of the State Educational 
Finance Commission.
We are attaching hereto, as a part hereof, a copy of the oral argu­
ment on behalf of the defendants, containing the quotations made from 




Robert McC. F igg, Jr.,
18 Broad Street,
Charleston, S. C.,
Attorneys for the Defendants.
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ORAL ARGUMENT FOR DEFENDANTS
Mr. F igg: May it please The Court, in his argument counsel has re­
ferred briefly to the background to the decisions of authority on the 
question of the constitutionality of legislation providing for separate 
schools for the white and colored races. It seems to us that it has been 
settled by the Supreme Court of the United States, by the other Federal 
Courts, and has been extensively investigated in the great number of 
briefs that we filed in the case of Sweatt against Printer, of which almost 
everyone who has had occasion to go into this question have obtained 
copies. And, since the case of Sweatt against Painter, our own Court 
of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit decided the case of Boyer against 
Garrett, a Baltimore case involving equal facilities in reference to play­
grounds, and whatnot, such as a golf course and swimming pool, which 
was decided in July, 1950, in which case the parties entered into a stipu­
lation that for the purposes of the case no question was made as to the 
facilities and services furnished the different races being not substantially 
equal, and the contention of the plaintiffs that, notwithstanding this 
equality of treatment, the rules providing for segregation violated the 
provisions of the Federal Constitution. The District Court dismissed the 
complaint on the authority of Plessy against Ferguson. And, the principal 
argument made on appeal was that the authority of Plessy against Fer­
guson has been so weakened by subsequent decisions, that we should 
no longer consider it binding.
The Court held:
“We do not think, however, that we are at liberty thus to disregard 
a decision of the Supreme Court which that court has not seen fit to 
overrule and which it expressly refrained from re-examining, although 
urged to do so, in the very recent case of Sweatt v. Painter, 70 S. Ct. 
848. It is for the Supreme Court, not us, to overrule its decisions or to 
hold them outmoded.”
“We need not consider arguments based on the 1st Amendment or 
the Charter of the United Nations. The 1st Amendment manifestly has 
no relation to athletic contests, and there is nothing in the Charter of 
the United Nations which, if applicable here, is of broader scope than 
the provisions of the 14th Amendment in forbidding racial dis­
crimination.”
Under the state of the authorities, as they now stand, it would seem 
that the statement which the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia made in the case of Carr v. Corning, 182 F. (2d) 14, a school
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case in the District of Columbia, which presented the same question of 
what might be called per se unconstitutionality of laws providing sepa­
rate schools for the races, is pertinent. The majority of that court, in 
an opinion by Circuit Judge Prettyman said this:
“It is urged that the separation of the races is itself, apart from 
equality or inequality of treatment, forbidden by the Constitution. 
The question thus posed is whether the Constitution lifted this 
problem out of the hands of all legislatures and settled it. We 
do not think it did. Since the beginning of human history, no cir­
cumstance has given rise to more diffcult and delicate problems 
than has the existence of different races in the same area. Centuries 
of bitter experience in all parts of the world have proved that the 
problem is insoluble by force of any sort. The same history shows 
that it is soluble by the patient process of community experience. 
Such problems lie naturally in the field of legislation, a method sus­
ceptible of experimentation, of development, of adjustment to the 
current necessities in a variety of community circumstances. We do 
not believe that the makers of the first ten Amendments in 1789 
or of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866 meant to foreclose legis­
lative treatment of the problem in this country.
“This is not to decry efforts to reach that state of common exist­
ence which is the obvious highest good in our concept of civilization. 
It is merely to say that the social and economic interrelationship of 
two races living together is a legislative problem, as yet not solved, 
and is not a  problem solved fully, finally and unequivocally by a 
fiat enacted many years ago. We must remember that on this partic­
ular point we are interpreting a constitution and not enacting a 
statute.”
Now, counsel mentioned the dissenting opinion in the Plessy case of 
Mr. Justice Harlan, as indicating a weakness of that authority as applied 
to this educational case. I only want to advert briefly to the background, 
as we see it, of the law on this question.
Prior to the war in 1861, there were laws providing for separate 
schools for the races in many states north of the Potomac River. There 
was one in Massachusetts, which was upheld in an opinion by Chief 
Justice Shaw in the case of Roberts against Boston, which was quoted 
by Mr. Justice Brown in the Plessy case. There was one in New York 
which was upheld by the Court of Appeals of New York in the 
Gallagher case. There was one in Indiana, one in Ohio, and various
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other States. And, Mr. Justice Brown took occasion in his opinion in 
Plessy against Ferguson to refer to the normal disposition of public 
school matters of the states, which had separate schools for the races
prior to 1861.
They show that the courts of those states had upheld the legislative 
prerogative of the legislative branch of the State Government, which 
provided public school systems, to enact provisions for the regulation 
of those school systems.
Now, prior to 1861, the power of the States which had dealt with 
the question of providing separate schools for the two races had not 
been questioned by court decision. It was the order of the day. And, it 
was the anaolgy which Mr. Justice Brown used as settled and normal, 
when he undertook to apply it to the facts of Plessy against Ferguson.
The research on this question in recent years has involved inquiry 
into the legislative history of the fourteenth amendment. And, it seems 
to us that the legislative history is conclusively compelling that the Con­
gress that proposed the 14th Amendment did not intend to interfere with 
the prerogative of the States in performing the States’ function of provid­
ing education, and the States’ power in providing public schools, to make 
provision for the separation of the white and colored races in those 
schools. The same Congress which submitted the 14th Amendment to the 
states of this country also enacted legislation providing separate schools 
for the two races in the District of Columbia. The same Congress that 
proposed the 14th Amendment also enacted the Civil Rights Legislation. 
And there were efforts in the Congress to make provision in the Civil 
Rights acts prohibiting separation of the races in the public schools of 
the states. And on every occasion, those proposals were defeated, and the 
Civil Rights Acts had no provision prohibiting states in regulating their 
school matters to provide separate schools for the races.
And the legislative history confirms the judgment of the judges of 
the Supreme Court of the United States who have passed upon these 
matters since, and those who have adverted to the question, who have 
dealt with the subject, have assumed that it was well settled. It might 
be said of this question, in a judicial way at this time, that the power 
of the states to separate the races in providing public school systems is 
the normal and not the abnormal proposition.
In the words of the highest Court of Maryland some time ago, as I 
was reading, the Court said in one short sentence “Separation of the
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races is normal treatment in this State,” and separating the races in 
public schools through the state’s enactment which provides for those 
schools, and levies taxes for those schools, has been normal in educa­
tional legislation ever since 1849, and earlier, as shown by the decisions 
that the Court referred to in the Plessy case.
And then in the Gong hum  case; and the Cummings case later, in­
volving an effort to enjoin the construction of a high school for white 
children on the ground that none had been afforded for colored children 
at that time, Cummings against the Board of Education, decided in 
1899. Mr. Justice Harlan wrote the opinion of the Supreme Court.
Counsel has referred to his dissenting opinion in the Plessy case on 
the question of separating the races in transportation. And, Mr. Justice 
Harlan’s dissenting opinion in the transportation case has been much 
quoted as weakening the application or as a foundation of approach to 
weaken the application of Plessy against Ferguson in school matters. 
But, Mr. Justice Harlan never did agree with the contentions in these 
school cases which have been made in his name, on the basis of his 
dissenting opinion in Plessy against Ferguson, because in later school 
cases, Mr. Justice Harlan drew what he considered an obvious distinc­
tion between the other cases; the Plessy case and the school cases.
He said in the Cummings case:
“Under the circumstances disclosed, we cannot say that this ac­
tion of the State court was, within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, a denial by the State to the plaintiffs, and to those as­
sociated with them of the equal protection of the laws, or of any 
privilege belonging to them as citizens of the United States. We may 
add that while all admit that the benefits and burdens of public 
taxation must be shared by citizens without discrimination against 
any class on account of their race, the education of the people in 
schools maintained by state taxation is a matter belonging to the 
respective States, and any interference on the part of Federal au­
thority with the management of such schools cannot be justified 
except in the case of a clear and unmistakable disregard of rights 
secured by the supreme law of the land.”
And, Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in other school cases. Mr. Justice 
Harlan dissented from the decision in Berea College v. Kentucky, which 
upheld the Act of Kentucky which prohibited the mixing of races in
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private schools in Kentucky. Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissenting 
opinion said :
“Of course zvhat I'have said has no reference to regulations pre~ 
scribed for public schools, established at the pleasure of the State 
and maintained at the public expense." 211 U. S. at 69.
And, in the Gong Lum case, Mr. Chief Justice Taft, speaking for a 
unanimous court, reviewed the Plessy case. He said this about Plessy 
against Ferguson:
“In Plessy v. Ferguson * * * in upholding the validity
under the Fourteenth Amendment of a statute of Louisiana re­
quiring the separation of the white and colored in railway coaches, 
a more difficult question than this, this Court, speaking of permitting 
race separation, said,
“ ‘The most common instance of this is connected with the estab­
lishment of separate schools for white and colored children, which 
has been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even 
by courts of States where the political rights of the colored race 
have been longest and most earnestly enforced.’ ”
The Court concluded :
“The right and power of the state to regulate the method of 
providing for the education of its youth at public expense is 
clear * * *”
“The decision is within the discretion of the State in regulating 
its public schools and does not conflict xvith the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”
In other words, to paraphrase the Supreme Court of Maryland’s 
statement, it was the normal thing, and most common prior to 1861, in 
states most zealous for the political rights of the colored race. It had 
never been questioned by court decision under the Constitution of 
Massachusetts, which contains a provision quite similar to the equal 
protection of the laws clause. And, Mr. Chief Justice Shaw’s decision, 
relied on or referred to by Mr. Justice Brown in the Plessy case, was 
deciding a case under the same fundamental proposition of law that 
these education cases come up under and that this case comes under. 
The equal protection of laws clause was substantially the same as the 
provisions in the Declaration of Rights of Massachusetts, and the Court 
there found nothing in the State’s Declaration of Rights that was con­
travened by the Massachusetts statute for separate schools.
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Now, in this case, as the Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit 
said, the Supreme Court expressly refrained from re-examining Plessy 
against Ferguson in Sweatt against Painter. It therefore expressly re­
frained from re-examining the body of the law on the power of the 
legislatures with reference to public schools, which is far older than the 
doctrine of Plessy against Ferguson, which Mr. Chief Justice Taft said 
in the Cong Lum case was a more diffcult question than a school case.
Now, the Cummings case is of peculiar interest, it seems to us, here. 
In the Cummings case, an injunction was sought against a white school 
because there were no Negro schools being built at that time. And, in 
that opinion, I think Mr. Justice Harlan pointed out that it would not 
help the cause of education to enjoin that school because another one 
was not being provided. And the Court in that case did recognize that 
the provision of school buildings and equipment and facilities cannot 
always be done at the same time and with the same identical architectural 
plan and simultaneously.
There is chronology in school-building construction. The newest school 
is always the best school, if the money hasn’t been thrown away, or if 
there were money enough to have started the trustees out in building it 
in the first place, unless there was an emergency presented. The best 
school in the City of Charleston, where we are now, is the new colored 
Burnet Rhett Elementary School, and I have been told it is the best 
school in the State. It is the newest school in South Carolina, and it is 
a fine example of a school building.
In Columbia we have the same proposition. The best schools in Colum­
bia today are the colored schools because they were the most recently 
built.
South Carolina has suffered, but not uniquely, from the lagging be­
hind of the development of school buildings and facilities and education 
in rural sections. I t’s not unique because if you will read in encyclo­
pedias, you will find that rural education is said by the experts to have 
lagged—and we have some mention of that in this record—behind the 
development of school systems in the urban centers, where there has 
been more resources and more school materials to encourage working 
with them.
The problem in this state, as stated by Governor Byrnes in his in­
augural address fairly and frankly, has been that the boys and girls in 
the rural sections are not going to get the educational buildings and
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facilities and opportunities that we want them to have and that they’re 
entitled to,—and that doesn’t mean one race any more than the other, - 
unless the power of the State of South Carolina is thrown behind that 
cause. And in this year, 1951, under his leadership, under his statement 
to the people of this state when he was inaugurated, we are going to 
furnish these facilities for everybody and we’re going to have substan­
tially equal facilities for the white and colored pupils because it is right 
and that is sufficient reason.
The people of this state and the Legislature have followed that leader­
ship, and they have gone into action, and they have enacted legislation 
placing the resources of our people behind that program, to the extent 
of a three percent sales tax,—not a two percent or a one percent, but a 
three percent sales tax, which I believe is regarded as heavy sales taxa­
tion anywhere. And, in the provision for seventy-five million dollars 
worth of bonds—I saw the other day it would take approximately 
forty million dollars perhaps, on the educational statistics avail­
able in the official report of the Department of Education, to bring about 
immediate building and facility equality between the two races through­
out the whole state. That doesn’t mean that it doesn t exist here, that 
means that we know that there is inequality in a great many parts of 
South Carolina, just as there is inequality between those same parts 
and other parts of South Carolina as to both white and colored children.
The program was intended—as it said and declared and the purpose 
iS;—and those charged with the enforcement of it have devoted them­
selves to the task—of furnishing equality of educational opportunities 
for all the children throughout the state; so that the State has taken the 
burden now of equalizing education for all the children,—not just the 
city children, not just the children of industrial sections, but the power 
of our people is behind every child, while or colored, in South Carolina 
to get education.
And the Governor has taken the Chairmanship of the State Educa­
tional Finance Commission to furnish continued leadership to see that 
the program that he advocated in his inaugural address is carried out. 
Now, I ’m not going into the details of that legislation. Mr. Crow on the 
stand yesterday testified in a graphic way as to what this legislation at 
the present rate of attendance today would mean to this school district. 
It would mean to the five districts who supplied white school children— 
and who have the population for the colored school children that you
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heard of—something over 2100, I believe—it would provide a total 
immediately available, as soon as the bond issue can be issued— 
and that would be July the first because that is the effective date of the 
revenue—of over four hundred thousand dollars. And you remember 
from the testimony of Doctor Whitehead in which he summarized the 
existing facilities, including this brick high school that has been talked 
about—this centralized high school—at less than seventy thousand dol­
lars of school facilities now. So that the four hundred and something 
thousand dollars available immediately on the basis of a loan, on a very 
low average daily attendance now existing, would re-build the white and 
colored systems of this district as soon as the architects and the con­
tractors and whatnot can complete the job. And, it would give the 
facilities for education to all of the pupils of those districts; and consoli­
dation of districts is one of the prime provisions of this school legisla­
tion, with the authority in the commission-—not in the Trustees, not 
in the County Board of Education, but in the State Commission—to see 
that proper district lines are laid out, so that this financing will do the 
most good, and will bring the results that the people of South Carolina 
will expect from the tasks that they have entered upon under the leader­
ship of the Governor.
Now, under Cummings against the Board of Education, are we to 
say that because inequalities might now exist in a particular place that 
schools may not be built, that education may not be provided. In the 
Hurst case, which was the sequel, I believe, to the Oklahoma case, it 
seems to me that The Court said either enroll this pupil or don’t enroll 
anybody. In other words, either enroll this applicant or stop giving 
education. Of course, the state took the first alternative there, and that 
was the alternative there, and that was the alternative approved by the 
lower court. And, the Supreme Court said that The Court had carried 
out the mandate of the decision in writing that order.
Now, if Your Honors please, I think it is recognized—at least to 
this writing it has not been re-examined—that it’s the function of the 
states of this nation to provide the educational systems, the educational 
legislation, the educational taxation, the public school systems. The end, 
as I said in my statement yesterday, is education. I t’s the same statement 
that I read to this lady this morning on the stand in the Myrdal quota­
tion. The end is education. The end is not to equalize down or to equalize 
out; the end is to equalize up. But, that takes time and the only way 
we’re going to have education is to equalize up.
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There’s no use to go into a situation where equality would be forcibly 
directed toward slicing educational privileges to make things equal. 
And that was the very clear understanding that Mr. Justice Harlan had 
of the problem in the Cummings case. And he refused to enjoin that 
school because he anticipated,—and the court did,—that that was a 
contribution to the cause of education, and that it would be followed 
by other evidences of the determination of the local authorities there 
to continue to bring it about under the school system.
Now, the State has the function of providing education, and this state 
has said we’re going to provide, as a matter of statewide interest, the 
physical facilities for the school system of this state for education. And 
I respectfully submit, if your Honors please, this being an action for a 
declaratory judgment and in the equitable jurisdiction of The Court, 
that The Court is entitled to exercise its discretion in the cause of 
getting more education, and not to the end of following out the conse­
quences which inevitably would flow from the position just taken by 
counsel,—that that means “now.” That isn’t compelling, as I under­
stand it, upon the Chancelor, upon his conscience, upon his discretion. 
He may1 bring about the result which Courts of equity have come into 
being to bring about,—the just and the beneficial and in the exercise of 
that equitable discretion.
Judge P arker: What decree do you suggest The Court ought to 
enter in the light of your admissions ?
Mr. F igg: We had in mind, if Your Honors please—our sug­
gestion is very briefly included in this statement, along this line: 
The defendants urge the Court in its discretion to give them a reason­
able time to formulate a plan for ending the inequalities, and for bring­
ing about equality of educational opportunities in the schools of this 
district, so that they may present plans for the Court’s consideration, 
with the approval of the state authorities necessary under the 1951 act, 
having in mind that it would have to have the approval of the Educa­
tional Finance Commission before it would be more than a proposal 
or a thought in mind. They would be for the Court’s consideration, 
the Court retaining jurisdiction, if it saw fit, of the cause in the mean­
time so that it may be enabled to grant such relief as may be proper in 
the event that the defendants should fail to comply with the Constitu­
tional standards prescribed in the applicable decisions.
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Judge Parker: Well, I ’m not much impressed with that. You have 
come into court here and admitted that facilities are not equal, and the 
evidence shows it beyond all peradventure. Now, it seems to me that 
it’s not for the Court to wetnurse the schools. Assuming that segrega­
tion is not abolished by the decree, it would be proper for this Court 
to direct an equalization of educational facilities. And we wouldn’t tell 
you how to do it. We wouldn’t attempt to supervise the administration 
of the schools; all we can do is to tell you to do what the Constitution 
enjoins upon you. Now what I ’m asking you is, what sort of decree 
ought to be entered with that end in view.
Mr. F igg: I think, if Your Honor pleases, that the decree should 
take into account the fact that school buildings cannot be built overnight. 
They have got to be built over a period of time. There have got to be 
plans drawn, there have got to be contracts made, and there has got to 
be construction done. And the reason that we suggested that the Court 
might retain jurisdiction and determine just exactly what these trus­
tees were going to do was, because we would be prepared to lay before 
the Court equality, with financing and with the ability to put it into 
effect right away, on buildings, on facilities, and various other phases 
of this school system. And, if we didn’t do that,—if the Court found 
that we didn’t measure up,—if there was any derailing of this program, 
the Court would have the same jurisdiction that it would have today 
to guarantee immediate and proper relief.
Judge Parker: Well, the Court would have that anyhow. The Court, 
in the exercise of its contempt powers would deal with failure to com­
ply with its decree. But that’s a different sort of a thing from holding 
the case back here and changing the decree from time to time. And that’s 
what you seem to suggest, and I ’m not certain that that’s what you 
want us to do.
Mr. F igg: I had hoped that Your Honors might consider that, be­
cause after all, as I said a while ago, the logical result of my statement 
that we are after education and educational facilities—
Judge Parker: Well, have you considered the course that was 
taken in the Virginia cases ?
Mr. F igg: N o, sir.
Judge Parker: We had this same problem in a number of counties 
in Virginia, and my recollection is that the District Court,—it wasn’t a 
three-judge court,—but it came on appeal to the Court of Appeals.
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And, my recollection is that the District Judge there directed that they 
equalize conditions within a given period. And the period is an im­
portant matter of consideration.
Mr. F igg: Yes, sir.
Judge W aring: Wasn’t the Virginia case brought on the distinct 
plea of separate and equal facilities and asking that they be equalized? 
As I understand it, this Court has got to face the issue of whether 
segregation is inequality per se or not.
Judge Parker: Well, that is unquestionably true, but he’s making 
his argument on the theory that segregation would not be abolished, 
and I ’m asking him what decree he suggests if The Court takes his 
view of the segregation issue.
Mr. F igg: Well, I think that a decree that equality of facilities be 
brought about, and of educational opportunities, within a certain time,— 
I don’t know just what time would be practical under existing condi­
tions. I know this: We’re trying to build a tuberculosis sanitarium in 
this county, and we’re having difficulty getting bids right now because 
the defense activities have called bidders away. They have taken other 
commitments, and we have had a shortage of bidders. Now, those kinds 
of things, I don’t believe would interfere with the carrying out of an 
orderly plan of constructing a school system. And, I have in mind per­
sonally, from the testimony that I have heard, that a great part of 
this school system up here is going to have to be rebuilt. The white ele­
mentary school, I think is going to have to be replaced. I think that 
schools are going to have to be built in many places, and I think that 
transportation is inevitably going to come into being in this layout up 
there under the new school law, and that the working together of the 
transportation and of the provisions as to facilities is going to make an 
efficient school system.
Now of course the issue has been presented here that separate 
schools are violative of the equal protection of the laws clause. I have 
made my suggestion to The Court on the premise that, as I told the 
Court, we think that under the decisions, that the Supreme Court of 
the United States cases up to this time sustain our position that segre­
gation cannot be adjudged to violate the equal protection clause of the 
14th Amendment. The State has got to give this education. The Courts, 
of course, can pass decrees to enforce the laws of the land, but it’s 
going to be the business of the states and their authorities to give the
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education. And I much prefer to see the matter take a positive course, 
which is going to produce in the quickest possible time education in 
this area, and of course which is going to avoid the possibility of 
compliance by reduction rather than compliance by addition. I want to 
see the purpose of this 1951 Act carried out throughout all of South 
Carolina. I think that nothing can be done in the cause of race rela­
tions greater than to improve the educational conditions in every sec­
tion of this state, and for all of the children of this state. It h^s been 
education which in the last 25 years has caused such great progress to 
be made in race relations in our section of the country,—education and 
internal improvements such as highways. And we have been making 
great progress in race relations, and there will come a time, in the 
opinion of many of these students that I have talked to, when the 
problem we are discussing here today will no longer exist in the United 
States. But, I say at this time, in the face of the evidence that we all 
know, of the considered public utterances of men who have given their 
lives to the improvement of race relations, that now is not the time to 
equalize by throwing the races into mixed schools, that utter confusion 
would exist.
I mentioned Doctor Howard Odom this morning, and his speech in 
Atlanta in April. I have talked with him since his speech, and he told 
me the other day, he said, “Why, that would upset 25 years of work 
that I have done in the field of race relations.” And, he is acknowledged 
to be the best informed man in that field from years of practical experi­
ence and study. And the zeal and enthusiasm with which he has burned 
the midnight oil trying to bring progress in the race relations of our 
section—and he values those 25 years of work that he’s done in that 
field, and he doesn’t want to see them upset by a measure that, as the 
court said in the District of Columbia, “goes counter to the experiences 
of human beings in their efforts to provide government and other things 
for themselves through the centuries.”
Now, if Your Honors please, in this part of the country, as Doctor 
Odom and others have written, you can’t pass laws against the “mores” 
of peoples, against their heritage—their complex heritages—that pre­
vail in this part of the world. Here is what Doctor Odom says on this:
“First in the southern situation is the cumulative racial and conflict 
heritage that has gone into the architecture of all cultures, whether in 
the bi-racial South or in India, in Pakistan, in China, in all the way- 
places of Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and in uncounted little culture
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islands of the Pacific; and in counted big nations and little democracies 
of the western world. This heritage, which is basic to conflict and war, 
is also the very heart of group loyalties, patriotism and institutional 
solidarity, symbolic of the universal formula by which men covenant 
for God, for country and for home/ The Southern culture structure 
rates the same diagnosis as any other.
“In the Southern situation is the same cumulative heritage which leads 
India’s powerful Nehru, as late as yesterday and in tomorrow’s news, to 
beg for the preservation of world peace and world order with hope and 
faith, but with an appeal for character and patience. But he adds, ‘Any­
way we can t have it suddenly or by decree. One has to grow up to it '* 
and again, in what he terms ‘an unbelievable varied world,’ he protests 
the quick ‘imposition of any form of foreign domination against the will 
of the people,’ on the structural grounds that ‘no solution which is not 
accepted by large masses of the people can have any possible enduring 
quality. Nor would Nehru relish the stereotype designation of being 
caricatured as a ‘gradualist,’ outmoded echo of superficial rationaliza­
tion.”
Doctor Odom knows the southern accumulated ‘mores’ of the peoples, 
that this part of the world has to deal with, in the last seventy-five or 
eighty years. You can’t just write those things off; they have happened 
and go into the people and the great feeling of good will and of working 
together that has bred throughout the south between these two races 
in the last fw years, being attributable to the work of men like that 
and of others. And, that man tells me that this kind of business in the 
public schools would upset 25 years of his work.
Now, if Your Honors please, he said this with reference to the mon­
umental task of equalizing facilities for education: This is the big prob­
lem challenging not only the will, strength and capacity of a strong 
people but the cooperation, judicial interpretation, and Constitutional 
structure of the nation. He said his agenda for equalizing educational 
opportunities applies to all levels of schooling and assumes the normal 
status and processes of segregation and non-segregation consistent with 
the development and administration of educational systems everywhere. 
He refers to the fact that he believes that graduate and professional 
schools should immediately move to admit the pupils of both races to 
their schools, but he says th is; that this is a structually different situation 
from elementary and secondary schools in the framework of America’s 
private, religious, and public school system. And then he says:
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“What is meant when we guarantee the conversion of the Southern 
compound bi-racial culture to an American complex integrated multi- 
cultured society ? It must be clear that we mean exactly that; the moving 
of the South from isolation and separatism, from conflict and organic 
structures which prevent large segments of the people from having 
equal access to opportunity, resources, work, personality, recognition, 
into cultural arrangements which permit free movement toward all op­
portunities. This means not only in the South but all over the nation. 
It means freedom for the Negro to take his place as an integer of cul­
tural structure exactly as does the Jewish, the European Nationals, the 
Oriental peoples, as well as the many strands of a world society inevit­
able in the total fabric of America now the cultural as well as economic 
and political capital of the world. Such a conversation brings with it no 
more compulsion or specifications for negating the facets of race and 
ethnic minorities, supreme in whatever personality and cultural loyal­
ties they may wish. Such a conversion automatically, as in any organic 
structure or process, carries with it the inevitable continuity of separate­
ness, autonomy, and segregation inherent in not only the American ideal 
but in all the newer reaches of social science, philosophy, freedom for all 
the differential-groups to have a say in how they shall integrate them­
selves into the new world society.” He was thinking then of both the 
white and colored people. And, he says:
“There are several other aspects of the situation with reference to 
segregation in education that carry a heavy load of responsibility. One 
is the continuity of the remarkable record of self development, distin­
guished achievement and high morale of Negro schools and colleges. For 
those who know the high motivations, the effective work, the institu­
tional loyalties, the student bodies, the professors—it is no easy decision 
to recommend anything but an increase of support and appreciation of 
both what they are doing and of the opportunity for students and faculty 
to work together without frustrations and aggressions.”
Now, if Your Honors please, here is a great deal of material that has 
been collected in the general learning on this subject. It is all predicated 
upon all conditions and research in this state, and other states affected 
on this question—not in Philadelphia, not in California, not in Spring- 
field, Massachusetts, and other places, but right here in South Carolina, 
North Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, and in these other states.
And that body of learning was recently emphasized by the speech 
that Dr. Frank Graham made to the joint assembly of the legislature of
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North Carolina on the occasion of the unveiling of Governor’s Aycock’s 
portrait, when he paid a great tribute to Governor Aycock and his leader­
ship in the cause of education around the turn of the century:
“In view of the origin, history, and power of the ‘mores’ of people 
based on the universal consciousness of kind, an historic social heritage, 
the degree of the visibility of the difference between raced, the large­
ness of the numbers of the groups involved and the economic competition 
of the low income groups, there is needed a new emphasis on the in­
fluence of religion, education, personal kindness, decent respect for the 
human dignity of persons, and voluntary cooperation of people of good 
will for better relations in the local communities, in the long haul of 
the generations for justice on this Earth. To our good Northern friends, 
I emphasize the unwisdom of using federal legislation and force at edu­
cational levels beyond the levels of acceptance by the people in the States. 
Such unwise compulsions cause bitter set-backs not enduring progress 
which mainly comes from within the minds and hearts of the majority 
of the people in the States.”
And, Governor Darden’s speech at the Southern Governor’s Confer­
ence right here in Charleston last November was a statesmanlike ap­
proach to this same problem. Governor Darden referred to the flare- 
ups around the world in South Africa, Australia, Pakistan, China, New 
Zealand and various other places in dealing with racial conditions and 
racial cultures and racial heritages, and whatnot, and he pointed out 
then that, while his view was that the greduate and professional schools 
should be open to all, because students who go there at a mature age 
for the education which they are hunting for, or they wouldn’t go there, 
and that it shouldn’t bother them what others are there for the same 
purpose, and at the same fountain of learning, but, when you come to 
the question of elementary and grammar and high schools, then you 
find Governor Darden pointing out the disastrous consequences of this 
forced mixing of the races in the public school systems provided by 
the southern states.
Now, if Your Honors please, I submit that this Court, under the 
Constitution and the decisions which have interpreted it, is not required 
or even warranted in holding that the Constitution and Statutes of 
South Carolina providing for these separate public school systems are 
unconstitutional. I submit also under the philosophy of the Cummings 
case and the other cases, in the light of the background and what has 
been done now to carry out the job of having a public school system in
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this state, in the light of the concrete and tangible evidence which we 
have laid before the Court of the fact that equality will be provided— 
that it would be appropriate for this Court in the exercise of its discre­
tion to make a practical order that we can comply with, that will ac­
complish the building up of education and the provision of equal fac­
ilities and will permit the State of South Carolina, without confusion 
and without all of the controversies that would be perhaps a little less 
in degree but only in degree than it was when the two reconstruction 
governors of South Carolina warned the reconstruction constitutional 
convention against that very proposition, and a resulting twelve-year 
sequel of mixed schools and no education or deteriorated education in 
the state had come about.
We submit, if Your Honors please, that this state wants to give edu­
cation. It wants to solve these social problems through education. It 
wants to carry out the educational system of instruction and learning, 
which it has determined that public schools should be provided for— 
not social development or the development of personality. The logical 
end of following the views of the educational experts as to what con­
stitutes modern education as they see it would seem to be that the State 
would not only have to do away with separate white and colored schools, 
but would also have to prohibit church schools and private schools, and 
require all children to go to the same public school system, so that, in 
the attrition of the hurly burly that would ensue, all children would re­
ceive the same social adjustment and personality development. The State 
is not required to adopt anybody’s expert opinion as to what is the edu­
cation which it affords. It is entitled to provide a system of schools to 
grant equal education, equal curricula, equal facilities, equal buildings, 
equal instruction and opportunities. And then these two races will con­
tinue to grow in their bi-racial cultures until the job of those schools 
has been done, and time has developed different adjustments to the cir­
cumstances, and then this problem will disappear as it disappeared in 
times past in the other states, which have been permitted to deal in their 
own time with the problem of their legislative functions.





